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1STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
For four years, Kyle Richardson waited while the State continued his trial, then sought an
appeal, then unnecessarily delayed having him transported to Idaho for trial.  While
Mr. Richardson waited, he was ineligible to undergo critically necessary drug treatment thereby
increasing the risk that his congestive heart condition would end his life sooner, rather than later.
Due to the State’s delays, and despite Mr. Richardson’s efforts to resolve the matter, he was not
tried until four years after he was initially arrested, and thus he was only able to have eighteen
months of his twelve-year, with five years fixed, Idaho sentence served concurrently with his
five-year federal sentence.  Further, the trial witnesses’ memories were seriously impaired due to
the  length  of  time  that  had  passed  since  Mr.  Richardson  was  first  arrested  for  selling
methamphetamine to a State confidential informant (hereinafter, CI) on three occasions in 2011.
Because Mr. Richardson’s jury trial was unnecessarily delayed for four years, his Constitutional
and statutory rights to a speedy trial and his rights under the Interstate Agreement on Detainers
were violated, his convictions and sentences should be vacated and his case dismissed with
prejudice.1
In its Respondent’s Brief, the State first asserts that Mr. Richardson delayed his own trial
because defense counsel sought time “to file responsive motions” to the state’s motion in limine
seeking to use the preliminary hearing transcript of Robert Bauer.  (Respondent’s Brief, p.10.)
However, Mr. Bauer passed away on March 23, 2012, yet the State waited until the last day of
1 Mr. Richardson also asserts that the district court erred when it admitted evidence of uncharged
prior bad acts at trial.  Mr. Richardson further contends that the district court erred in awarding
$2,738.46 in restitution where the State failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence the
amount requested on behalf of the ISP.
2July, just 20 days before the jury trial was set to begin, to seek to use its now-deceased witness’s
prior testimony.  (R., pp.79-80, 119.)  Mr. Richardson quickly filed a response on August 9,
2012; however, the State did not file a reply in time for the August 16, 2012 hearing because the
prosecutor had been on vacation.  (8/16/12 Tr., p.12, L.23 – p.13, L.1.)  Despite these facts, the
State  now  seeks  to  penalize  Mr.  Richardson  because  the  district  court  set  out  the  trial  date  to
allow the motion to be heard.  The State also argues that Mr. Richardson caused delay in his case
by crafting too persuasive of an argument against the admittance of the preliminary hearing
testimony of Robert Bauer, such that the district court denied the State’s motio,n which required
the state to file an interlocutory appeal.  (Respondent’s Brief, pp.11, 15.) Finally, the State argues
that any error in the district court’s denial of Mr. Richardson’s motion to dismiss was harmless,
because the dismissal would have been without prejudice and the State could have re-filed the
charges in a new complaint.  (Respondent’s Brief, pp.17-18.)  All of these arguments are without
merit.
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated in
Mr.  Richardson’s  Appellant’s  Brief.   They  need  not  be  repeated  in  this  Reply  Brief,  but  are
incorporated herein by reference.
3ISSUES2
1. Did the district court err when it violated Mr. Richardson’s speedy trial rights?
2. Did  the  district  court  err  in  denying  Mr.  Richardson’s  motion  to  dismiss  based  on  the
State’s failure to comply with the Interstate Agreement on Detainers’ 180 day deadline?
3. Did the district court err in admitting evidence of Mr. Richardson’s prior bad acts?
4. Did  the  district  court  abuse  its  discretion  when  it  ordered  Mr.  Richardson  to  pay
restitution in the absence of substantial evidence to support such an award?
2 In his Reply Brief, Mr. Richardson will address only the State’s arguments as to his first issue,
whether Mr. Richardson’s speedy trial rights were violated.  The remaining issues were fully
addressed in Mr. Richardson’s initial Appellant’s Brief.
4ARGUMENT
Mr. Richardson’s Statutory And Constitutional Rights To A Speedy Trial Were Violated When
The District Court Denied His Motion To Dismiss And Set The Case For Trial Four Years After
The Information Was Filed
A. Introduction/Clarification
Both the district court’s decision and the State’s arguments on appeal are premised on the
belief  that  federal  and  state  Constitutional  speedy  trial  rights  and  statutes  are  suspended  or
ineffective when the defendant is being held in another jurisdiction.  (R., p.273; Respondent’s
Brief, p.13.)  This is inaccurate.  The IAD does have its own speedy trial provision, but that is
separate and apart  from Constitutional or statutory speedy trial  rights.   As stated by the United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, “[t]he protections of the IAD are not founded on
constitutional rights, or the preservation of a fair trial, but are designed to facilitate a defendant's
rehabilitation in prison and to avoid disruptions caused when charges are outstanding against the
prisoner in another jurisdiction.” United States v. Black, 609 F.2d 1330, 1334 (9th Cir. 1979);
see also Reed v. Farley, 512 U.S. 339, 358 (1994) (plurality opinion) (Scalia, J. and Thomas, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in judgment) (violation of IAD technicality “neither produces
nor is analogous to (1) lack of jurisdiction of the convicting court, (2) constitutional violation, or
(3) miscarriage of justice or denial of rudimentary procedures.”)).3
Further, “[t]he IAD amounts to nothing more than a set of procedural rules, and the rights
it protects in no way affect the fairness and accuracy of the factfinding procedure or other due
process or trial rights.” People v. Nitz, 268 Cal. Rptr. 54, 57 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990) (citing Gray v.
Benson 458 F. Supp. 1209, 1213 (D. Kan.1978)); see also People v. Brooks, 234 Cal. Rptr. 573
3 The United States Supreme Court has held the IAD’s interpretation presents a question of
federal law. State v. Mangum, 153 Idaho 705, 709 (Ct. App. 2012). Therefore, the Idaho
appellate courts will give particular attention to federal court decisions interpreting the IAD. Id.
5(Cal. Ct. App. 1987) (problems that IAD was intended to remedy were administrative problems;
legislative history shows little concern with speedy trial rights per se); Drescher v. Superior
Court of California, 267 Cal. Rptr. 661 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990) (The purpose of IAD is to facilitate
rehabilitation in prison and to avoid disruptions, rather than to preserve right to fair trial);
Watson v. Ralston, 419 F. Supp. 536 (W.D. Wis. 1976) (holding that by making the United
States a party to the Interstate Agreement on Detainers, Congress did not intend that the Sixth
Amendment guaranty of a speedy trial was to be measured by the speedy trial provisions of the
Agreement); State v. Dean, 399 A. 2d. 1367 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1979) ( holding that defendant
who is incarcerated in another state is not required to invoke the provisions of the Interstate
Agreement on Detainers as a condition precedent to preserving his claim to a denial of the
speedy trial rights guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution); People v. Rodriguez,
209 N.W. 2d 441 (Mich. App. 1973) (holding that the Interstate Agreement on Detainers is not
the sole guaranty of the right to a speedy trial when an accused is imprisoned in a foreign
jurisdiction).
B. The  District  Court  Violated  Mr.  Richardson’s  Right  To  A Speedy Trial  As  Guaranteed
By The United States And Idaho Constitutions
1. The Four Year Delay Is Presumptively Prejudicial
The State has conceded that the delay in this case of nearly four years (1,433 days)
triggered the Barker balancing test.  (Respondent’s Brief, p.8.)
62. The State’s Reasons For The Delay, Taken As A Whole, Do Not Justify The
Delay
The State claims that all of the delays causing Mr. Richardson’s trial to occur four years
after the information was first filed can be attributed to Mr. Richardson (Respondent’s Brief,
pp.7-17); however, this is a fallacy.  Mr. Richardson is not responsible for the delays.
The  State  asserts  that  Mr.  Richardson  complains  of  two  delays  before  he  was  tried  on
these charges.  (Respondent’s Brief, p.9.)  However, in his Appellant’s Brief, Mr. Richardson
identified the length of delay as nearly four years, and specifically addressed three time periods
in which delays occurred prior to his trial.  (Appellant’s Brief, pp.12-17.)  In Section II of the
Appellant’s Brief, Mr. Richardson further discussed the State’s delays in trying him within the
six month time period.  (Appellant’s Brief, pp.22-36.)  Notably, the State did not provide reasons
for  why it  failed  to  act  for  almost  twelve  months—from the  time the  speedy trial  demand was
filed in February of 2015, until the December 2015 trial.  Mr. Richardson incorporates by
reference his discussion of the delays occurring in bringing him to trial as set forth in Section II
of the Appellant’s Brief.
The State mischaracterizes what occurred at the August 16, 2012 hearing and appears to
be implying that Mr. Richardson waived his right to a speedy trial when his counsel confirmed
with the court that there was no “implication of speedy trial at all because of that.”
(Respondent’s Brief, pp.10-11.)  However, a “waiver” occurs when the defendant has engaged in
conduct which may be characterized as “an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a
known right or privilege.” Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938).  The State’s contention
is absurd.
The  State’s  motion  to  use  the  preliminary  hearing  testimony of  Robert  Bauer  was  filed
only 20 days before the August 20, 2012 trial was set to begin.  (8/16/12 Tr., p.12, Ls.1-9.)
7However, Mr. Bauer passed away on March 23, 2012.  (R., p.125.)  The State filed its Motion to
Admit Preliminary Hearing Transcript Testimony of Robert Bauer – Deceased on July 31, 2012.
(R., pp.79-103.)  The State should have been aware that its key witness had passed away back in
March, yet the State waited until the last day of July, just 20 days before the jury trial was set to
begin, to seek to use its now-deceased witness’s prior testimony.  (R., pp.79-80.)
Mr. Richardson quickly filed a response on August 9, 2012; however, the State did not file a
reply in time for the August 16, 2012 hearing, because the prosecutor had been on vacation.
(8/16/12 Tr., p.12, L.23 – p.13, L.1.)  Mr. Richardson attached to his response a copy of
Mr. Bauer’s obituary, as published in the local newspaper, indicating Mr. Bauer died on
March 23, 2012.  (R., pp.119-125.)
A hearing was held on the State’s motion on August 16, 2012.  (R., p.153.)  At the
hearing, the prosecutor apologized for not filing a written response to Mr. Richardson’s objection
to the State’s motion to use the preliminary hearing testimony, she explained that she “was on
vacation until the beginning of the week, so [she] had not had an opportunity to respond in
writing.”  (8/16/12 Tr., p.12, L.23 – p.13, L.1.)  She told the district court she was prepared to
respond orally if the Court wanted to take oral argument.  (8/16/12 Tr., p.13, Ls.2-3.)  The court
met with both counsel in chambers, and, when back on the record, said that it would be moving
the trial date “because the motions filed on your behalf have come in very close to the trial date
and we need to sort those motions out.”  (8/16/12 Tr., p.13, L.11 – p.14, L.4.)  The court set the
pending motions to be heard in one month.  (8/16/12 Tr., p.14, Ls.4-8.)  The court commented
that setting the trial out would allow the State an opportunity to respond and get their response
filed before the hearing.  (8/16/12 Tr., p.14, Ls.9-21.)  Defense counsel then clarified that the
8vacation of the trial date did not affect his client’s speedy trial rights, to which the district court
agreed.  (8/16/12 Tr., p.15, Ls.4-15.)  To be clear, the discourse was as follows:
THE COURT:  We are back on the record, I have had an opportunity to speak
with Counsel.
And, Counsel, as we have discussed, we have pending motions in each of the two
cases, and admittedly the motions have come in in such a time frame that it would
make it difficult obviously for the State to respond and the Court to decide these.
And what happens in one case may have some affect [sic] on the resolution of the
other case, as I understand it.
So,  Mr.  Richardson,  in  light  of  that,  what  we  are  going  to  do  is  vacate  the  trial
settings for Monday, so that -- because the motions filed on your behalf have
come in very close to the trial date and we need to sort those motions out.  So we
are vacating both trial dates, and I’m going to schedule all of the pending motion,
and that would be in both cases, for oral argument on the 20th of  September  at
10:30 a.m.
So, Mr. Richardson, you must be present on September 20 at 10:30 a.m., and
that’s when we will  – I  will  hear argument on the motions.   In the interim time
period, the State will have an opportunity to respond and get their response
briefing  to  the  Court.   We are  going  to  argue  the  --  have  motions  in  both  cases
argued at the same time, the Court intends to then enter a decision as to the
motions,  and  then  we  will  get  together  subsequent  to  that  and  talk  about  either
rescheduling for trial or some kind of resolution based on what the Court has
decided as to those pending motions.  Do you understand that?
THE DEFENDANT:  Yes, sir.
THE COURT:  Okay.  So I will see you all back here on the 20th of September at
10:30 a.m. so that we can hear motions in both cases.  And, again, the jury trial
scheduled in both of these cases for Monday at 9;00 a.m. are vacated.
MS. DICKERSON:  Thank you, your Honor.
MR. RADAKOVICH:  Your Honor, may I also state just in all fairness for the
record that since the trials were vacated because of some lateness of the motions, I
don’t consider that there is any implication of speedy trial at all because of that.
THE COURT:  Thank you for articulating that.  And I think, Mr. Richardson, that
would  be  the  Court’s  view  as  well,  I  think  this  is  necessitated  by  the  time  --  I
guess lack of timeliness, I’m not pointing fingers at any one, but the reason we are
doing this is so that the motions filed by the Defendant can be sorted out.
9(8/16/12 Tr., p.13, L.15 – p.15, L.15.)  The Idaho Court of Appeals “has held that ‘[t]he
unauthorized representations of defense counsel do not constitute a waiver of [a defendant’s]
rights that would preclude [a defendant] from later asserting a violation of his right to a speedy
trial.’” State v. Lopez, 144 Idaho 349, 352 (Ct. App. 2007) (quoting State v. Beck, 128 Idaho
416, 419 (Ct. App. 1996)).
Further, the Oxford dictionary defines “implication” as a noun meaning:
· 1. the conclusion that can be drawn from something, although it is not explicitly
stated: "the implication is that no one person at the bank is responsible"
synonyms: suggestion, insinuation, innuendo, hint, intimation, imputation
· 2. the action or state of being involved in something: "our implication in the
problems" synonyms: incrimination, involvement, connection, entanglement,
association, inculpation
Based on its response, the court clearly understood that defense counsel was asking if the
court’s decision to vacate and reset the trial date so that the pending motions could be fully
briefed was going to be deemed some sort of speedy trial waiver or a request for continuance.
The district court reassured defense counsel that the delay (to allow the State to file both a reply
in support of its motion in limine and presumably a response to the defendant’s motion to
suppress in Nez Perce County case number 2011-8658) would not be attributed to the defense
such that it could affect Mr. Richardson’s speedy trial rights.  Mr. Richardson did not request the
trial date to be vacated.  While his counsel recognized that the court may wish to vacate the trial
date  to  allow  the  State  additional  time  to  reply  to  Mr.  Richardson’s  objection  to  evidence  the
State sought to use at trial, the prosecutor offered to simply respond at the hearing, negating any
need for additional response time.  (R., p.153.)  Further, while the court likely hoped for a global
resolution  with  Mr.  Richardson’s  other  case,  there  was  no  need  to  vacate  the  trial  date  in this
10
case.4  Acquiescing to the court’s scheduling decision did not constitute a request by
Mr. Richardson to vacate the trial date.
The  State  also  claims  that  Mr.  Richardson  caused  delay  by  stipulating  with  counsel  to
continue the preliminary hearing and by requesting a two week extension to file pre-trial
motions.   (Respondent’s  Brief,  p.9.)   First, Folk holds that postponement of the trial, not the
preliminary hearing, at defendant’s request waives the protection of the speedy trial clause.
State v. Folk 151 Idaho 327, 332 (2011).  Second, although Mr. Richardson did file a motion
requesting an additional two weeks to complete pre-trial motions, the motion was never ruled on,
presumably because the State asked for a continuance two weeks later, which the district court’s
response was to vacate the trial setting.  (R., pp.70-75.)  Thus, Mr. Richardson did not instigate a
delay of the trial.
The State claims that “because Richardson caused the need for the interlocutory appeal
by inviting the district court to exclude essential evidence on an erroneous basis, the attendant
delay was also attributable to Richardson and does not implicate his speedy trial rights.”
(Respondent’s Brief, p.11.)  The State continues by arguing that almost all of the delay in
bringing Mr. Richardson to trial “is directly attributable to Richardson’s inviting the district court
to  make  an  erroneous  ruling  on  the  admissibility  of  essential  evidence  in  his  case  (which
necessitated an interlocutory appeal).”  (Respondent’s Brief, p.15.)  The State apparently argues
that Mr. Richardson caused delay in his case by crafting too persuasive of an argument against
the admittance of the preliminary hearing testimony of Robert Bauer.  Such an argument is
preposterous.  The duty to bring a defendant to trial lies with the State, not the defendant.
Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 527 (1974); State v. Hobson, 99 Idaho 200, 202 (1978).  It is
4 Defense counsel did not consent to the cases being set for trial together.  (R., p.65.)
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ludicrous for the State to suggest that Mr. Richardson should be penalized for making a legal
argument that persuaded the district court, but which the appellate court ultimately reversed.
The State summarizes Mr. Richardson’s speedy trial claims as amounting to “two delays”
(Respondent’s Brief, p.9); however, while Mr. Richardson’s trial was delayed by the State’s first
request that the trial be vacated due to an unavailable witness, and the State’s second delay to
make an interlocutory appeal, Mr. Richardson also suffered substantial delay as discussed in
detail  in  Section  II  of  the  Appellant’s  Brief.   That  is,  once  Mr.  Richardson  was  served  with  a
bench warrant on January 6, 2015 (R., p.231), he filed a demand for speedy trial on February 2,
2015, seeking to have his Idaho charges resolved (R., pp.207-210), yet the State failed to try
Mr. Richardson until December of 2015, almost a full year after he demanded a speedy trial.
Mr. Richardson Suffered Prejudice As A Result Of The Delay
The record does not support the State’s claim that Mr. Richardson suffered no prejudice.
It is quite clear from the record that Mr. Richardson wanted his Idaho case resolved and he
suffered from the stress and uncertainty of not knowing what would be his fate.  Mr. Richardson
was forced to file multiple pleadings seeking resolution (R., pp.207-210; 230-239, 244-248, 266-
268, 270-272, 275-280); his attorney attended a litany of monthly status hearings, asserting
Mr. Richardson’s wish to be tried (R., pp.212-218, 229, 240; 2/19/25 Tr.; 4/23/15 Tr.); in
addition to Mr. Richardson’s lost opportunity to attend an excellent substance abuse treatment
program in Oregon (2/19/15 Tr., p.27, Ls.13-24; R., pp.268, 275-277; PSI, p.10).
The State asserts that Mr. Richardson never “sat in jail” in relation to this case until
October of 2015 because he did not request credit for time served for any of the previous period
of incarceration.  (Respondent’s Brief, p.14.)  The period of time for which Mr. Richardson
asked  for  credit  for  time  served  does  not  establish,  as  fact,  the  length  of  time  he  sat  in  jail  in
12
relation to this case.  This is particularly true in light of the recent decision by the Idaho Supreme
Court in State v. Brand, 162 Idaho 189 (2017) (holding that defendants were entitled to credit for
time served as long as their prejudgment incarceration was for the offense they were convicted of
and sentenced for).   The law has changed, even since Mr. Richardson filed his motion for credit
for time served on March 11, 2016.5  (R., p.365.)
The State claims that Mr. Richardson suffered no prejudice during his years of
incarceration while the Idaho charges stagnated because Mr. Richardson was incarcerated and
serving his time for a different crime.  (Respondent’s Brief, pp.13-14.)  However,
Mr. Richardson certainly suffered prejudice due to the anxiety and concern of a pending,
unresolved case in another state and suffered in his ability to defend himself, as discussed in the
Appellant’s Brief.
When analyzing prejudice to the defense caused by pretrial delay, the reviewing court
will look to the details of the evidence that the defendant claims has become stale, “and conducts
a loose ‘but-for’ analysis to look for a causal connection between the delay and the prejudice.”
United States v. Battis, 474 F. Supp. 2d 727, 734 (E.D. Pa. 2007).  Because “what has been
forgotten can rarely be shown,” the defendant is not necessarily required to affirmatively show
how he has been prejudiced by the delay because there is a presumption of prejudice that grows
correspondingly  with  the  length  of  the  delay. Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647, 655-57
(1992) (holding delay of 32 months (over eight years) presumptively prejudicial to defendant).
The speedy trial guarantee protects three basic demands of the criminal justice system:
“(1) to prevent undue and oppressive incarceration prior to trial, (2) to minimize anxiety and
5 Mr. Richardson reserves the right to file a motion pursuant to I.C.R. 35(c) seeking credit for all
time spent incarcerated in this case.
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concern accompanying public accusation and (3) to limit the possibilities that long delay will
impair the ability of an accused to defend himself.” Smith v. Hooey, 393 U.S. 374, 378 (1969)
(quoting United States v. Ewell, 383 U.S. 116, 120 (1966)).  “These demands are both
aggravated and compounded in the case of an accused who is imprisoned by another
jurisdiction.” Id.
When discussing these three demands, the United States Supreme Court has said:
At first blush it might appear that a man already in prison under a lawful sentence
is hardly in a position to suffer from ‘undue and oppressive incarceration prior to
trial.’  But  the  fact  is  that  delay  in  bringing  such  a  person  to  trial  on  a  pending
charge may ultimately result in as much oppression as is suffered by one who is
jailed without bail upon an untried charge. First, the possibility that the defendant
already in prison might receive a sentence at least partially concurrent with the
one he is serving may be forever lost if trial of the pending charge is postponed.
Secondly, under procedures now widely practiced, the duration of his present
imprisonment may be increased, and the conditions under which he must serve his
sentence greatly worsened, by the pendency of another criminal charge
outstanding against him.
And while it might be argued that a person already in prison would be less likely
than others to be affected by ‘anxiety and concern accompanying public
accusation,’ there is reason to believe that an outstanding untried charge (of which
even a convict may, of course, be innocent) can have fully as depressive an effect
upon a prisoner as upon a person who is at large.
In the opinion of the former Director of the Federal Bureau of Prisons,
‘[I]t  is  in  their  effect  upon  the  prisoner  and  our  attempts  to
rehabilitate him that detainers are most corrosive. The strain of
having to serve a sentence with the uncertain prospect of being
taken into the custody of another state at the conclusion interferes
with the prisoner’s ability to take maximum advantage of his
institutional opportunities. His anxiety and depression may leave
him with little inclination toward self-improvement.’
Finally, it is self-evident that ‘the possibilities that long delay will impair the
ability of an accused to defend himself’ are markedly increased when the accused
is incarcerated in another jurisdiction. Confined in a prison, perhaps far from the
place where the offense covered by the outstanding charge allegedly took place,
his ability to confer with potential defense witnesses, or even to keep track of
their whereabouts, is obviously impaired. And, while ‘evidence and witnesses
14
disappear, memories fade, and events lose their perspective,’ a man isolated in
prison is powerless to exert his own investigative efforts to mitigate these erosive
effects of the passage of time.
Smith v. Hooey, 393 U.S. 374, 378–80 (1969) (internal footnotes and citations omitted).  Further,
as the United States Supreme Court noted, “excessive delay presumptively compromises the
reliability of a trial in ways that neither party can prove or, for that matter, identify.” Doggett v.
United States, 505 U.S. 647, 655–56 (1992).  Although such presumptive prejudice must be
considered in conjunction with the other criteria set forth in Barker, “it is part of the mix of
relevant facts, and its importance increases with the length of delay.” Id.
Here, Mr. Richardson was initially sent to a superb drug treatment facility in Oregon but,
due to his pending state cases in Idaho, he was transferred to Indiana and thereby lost the
opportunity to participate in the much-needed drug treatment program.  (2/19/15 Tr., p.27, Ls.13-
24; R., p.268; PSI, p.10.)  Mr. Richardson also had to contend with the anxiety of waiting nearly
four years for his trial, not knowing whether he might walk out of jail a free man, be condemned
to a life in prison, or something in between.  Finally, Mr. Richardson’s defense was significantly
compromised because the witnesses could not recall the circumstances by which Mr. Richardson
was alleged to have sold methamphetamine—including locations and whether the CI was out of
the sight of the officers at critical times.  Thus, Mr. Richardson suffered significant prejudice due
to the four-year delay.
C. The  District  Court  Violated  Mr.  Richardson’s  Right  To  A Speedy Trial  As  Guaranteed
By Idaho Statute And The Error Was Not Harmless
The State asserts that Mr. “Richardson waived his statutory speedy trial rights when he
caused his trial to be postponed.”  (Respondent’s Brief, pp.15-18.)  However, a “waiver” occurs
when the defendant has engaged in conduct which may be characterized as “an intentional
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relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.” Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458,
464 (1938).  As discussed in section B, herein, Mr. Richardson did not “waive” his state statutory
right to a speedy trial by acquiescing to the district court’s decision to set out the trial or by
becoming incarcerated on an unrelated charge.
Finally, the State argues that any error in the district court’s denial of Mr. Richardson’s
motion to dismiss was harmless, because the dismissal would have been without prejudice and
the State could have re-filed the charges in a new complaint.  (Respondent’s Brief, pp.17-18.)
The State’s argument is specious for a number of reasons.
First, if this Court finds the district court should have granted Mr. Richardson’s motion to
dismiss,  by  definition,  the  error  would  not  be  harmless,  because  this  Court  would  necessarily
have to find the district court should have dismissed the case. The harmless error test articulated
by the United States Supreme Court in Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967), applying to
all preserved errors found by Idaho Appellate Courts (see State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 227
(2010)), is not beholden to the presumed ability or inability of the prosecutor to re-file charges
and obtain convictions anew.  Such a standard would require an appellate Court to theorize what
might have happened in proceedings conducted in an alternative universe, or what could happen
in future proceedings conducted in this universe, rather than look at how the error effected the
actual proceedings spawning the appeal before the Court.  This is simply not the standard. See
State v. Sharp, 101 Idaho 498, 507 (1980) citing Chapman, 386 U.S. at 24 (“To hold an error as
harmless, an appellate court must declare a belief, beyond a reasonable doubt, that there was no
reasonable possibility that such evidence complained of contributed to the conviction.”).
Next, while the prosecutor may have re-filed charges if the district court granted
Mr. Richardson’s motion to dismiss, there is no evidence in the record that it would have done
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so.  The State is required to show the error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt (see Perry), a
standard that requires more than supposition on the part of the State’s appellate counsel.
In sum, the State’s harmless error argument fails because it misapplies the Perry
standard.  Idaho Appellate Courts consider what actually happened, not what could have
happened  if  the  district  court  did  not  err  in  the  first  place.   If  the  prosecutor  seeks  to  re-file
charges upon this Court granting Mr. Richardson’s request for appellate relief, the legality of
such a decision, and the consequences thereof, should be first addressed by the district court.
CONCLUSION
Mr. Richardson respectfully requests that this Court vacate the district court’s order
denying his motion to dismiss and remand his case to the district court for the entry of an order
dismissing the instant matter with prejudice.  Alternatively, Mr. Richardson respectfully requests
that this Court vacate his convictions and remand to the district court for a new trial.
Mr. Richardson requests that the restitution award be vacated.
DATED this 1st day of August, 2017.
_________/s/________________
SALLY J. COOLEY
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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